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Abstract
Fake file systems are used in the field of cyber deception to bait intruders and fool forensic investigators. File
system researchers also frequently generate their own synthetic document repositories, due to data privacy and
copyright concerns associated with experimenting on real-world corpora. For both these fields, realism is
critical. Unfortunately, after creating a set of files and folders, there are no current testing standards that can be
applied to validate their authenticity, or conversely, reliably automate their detection. This paper reviews the
previous 30 years of file system surveys on real world corpora, to identify a set of discrete measures for
generating synthetic file systems. Statistical distributions, such as size, age and lifetime of files, common file
types, compression and duplication ratios, directory distribution and depth (and its relationship with numbers of
files and sub-directories) were identified and the respective merits discussed. Additionally, this paper highlights
notable absences in these surveys, which could be beneficial, such as analysing, on mass, the text content
distribution, file naming habits, and comparing file access times against traditional working hours.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the implementation of the Multics Operating System 40 years ago, most current operating system
software provides a facility to organise programs and data files in hierarchical structures (Henderson, 2004).
File systems can contain the base executable version of the operating system in additional to applications and
configuration data (Kim and Spafford, 1994). Users can also employ file systems as a central repository of their
collective knowledge, such as correspondence, study material, travel information, financial records and
inventions (Salminen, et al., 1997).
Fake file systems are a set of synthetic data files arranged in a manner to replicate real digital repositories.
While artificially created file systems are used in cyber deception to lure unauthorised users or to sustain a
falsehood, they also have other important benign applications, such as supporting research and development into
replication and archiving. The key limitation in their application is an absence of common or agreed baseline
metrics for building or evaluating these synthetic products. The consequence of this research gap is that fake file
systems can be produced that either lack realism, contain uniquely identifiable characteristics that can be
detected, or both. This paper presents the results of a literature review of the previous thirty years of published
file system surveys. The aim of the research is to extract metrics and identify common themes to improve the
realism and reduce detectability of synthetic file systems. These results are the first step in a multi-stage process.
The next stage of the research is to test these common statistical distributions by building replica file systems.

FILE ATTRIBUTES
Most modern operating systems provide users with visibility of characteristics of accessible files, such as
content, attributes and metadata (Carrier and Spafford, 2004). Characteristics such as file name, file size,
location, and file type or file-extension assist users to identify specific documents and navigate the file system
(Ritchie and Thompson, 1974). Time-based attributes can also be accessed by the user, such as: (1) atime updated when the file is read; (2) mtime - updated when the file contents change (the default file time in most
cases); and (3) ctime - updated when the file or certain file characteristics (owner, permissions) change (Daley
and Neumann, 1965). The user and group identifier were also introduced in Unix (and later adopted by
Microsoft's New Technology File System) providing information on who can read, write and execute the file
(Buchholz and Spafford, 2004). The owner of the file can also modify the filename, which can provide clues to
the purpose, version number and creation date (Anquetil and Lethbridge, 1997).
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Additional information can also be obtained from documents with further analysis, such as inspecting the
content of the file to classify the type and whether or not the file is encrypted or compressed (Erbacher and
Mulholland, 2007; Li et al., 2005; McDaniel, M., & Heydari, 2003). Some file types also save additional
metadata in the contents, such as the author's name, initials, organisation name, computer's name, document
revisions and versions, template information and comments. Files can be differentiated through review of their
content's entropy (Shannon, 2001), word and character count, strings, language and writing style analysis
(Mosteller and Wallace, 1963; Somers and Tweedie, 2003; Abbasi and Chen, 2008) and cryptographic hash
(Kim, 1994).
Combinations of characteristics can be used to categorise and classify files (Goncalves and Jorge, 2003; Ellard,
et al., 2003), and unexpected combinations can be used to differentiate the real from the fake (Rowe, 2005).

FAKE FILE SYSTEMS
Individual fake files have been referred to as honeytokens (Spitzner, 2003), honeyfiles (Yuill et al., 2004),
digital decoys (Kushner, 2003), decoy files (Bowen et al., 2009), and canary files (Whitham, 2013a). Stoll
(2005) was the first to publicly discuss the use of fake files in cyber deception. He handcrafted several
documents to successfully track and identify an unauthorised user on his network. His work inspired several
others. Bowen, et al (2009) developed the Decoy Document Distributor System, which is a tool for generating
and monitoring individual fake files. Yuill, et al (2004) also proposed a fake file generation, distribution and
alert system to simplify the operation and management of individual fake files. Finally, Whitham (2013b)
proposed a method to automate the generation of fake files to perform a watermarking role, using content from
the local and nearby directories.
On a mass scale, Gerwehr and Glenn (2003), and Cohen (2003) independently noted that whole fake file
systems can be generated for honeypots to suggest that real users have been using the system in normal ways.
Garfinkel (2009) and Rowe (2006) both proposed generating a synthetic file system using publicly available
data, Internet searches or other random text. Assuming that there are no copyright concerns, these files can be
assembled into a hierarchical set of folders resembling a modern file repository.

RESEARCH APPLICATION
Realism is critically important for fake files deception (Whitham, 2014). The primary challenge with artificially
constructed datasets is that while the text content may be genuine, the document arrangements are rarely a true
representation of a real file system (Arnold and Bell, 1997; Ellard et al., 2003). File system corpora should
include corruptions, compressed files, duplications, previous versions of documents, natural modifications to
file characteristics due to operating system processes, and realistic distributions of time meta-data, directories
and files (Chow et al., 2007). Artificially generated corpora can also fail to mimic the diverse behaviours of
different users (Ellard et al., 2003) and human document management processes (Goncalves and Jorge, 2003).
Poor fake file system constructions can also introduce identifiable characteristics that allow a forensic examiner
or intruder to develop automated processes to counter the deception; a single test function would thus easily
distinguish the real from the fake (Bowen et al., 2009). Examples include: anomaly-based detection, which can
be employed against the fake file system, comparing a range of metrics against those of typical computer
systems (Rowe, 2006), inspecting randomly-chosen files or directories to see if they look ‘normal’ (Fu et al.,
2006), checking content against other nearby material to determine if it is out of place (Lavoie and
Krishnamoorthy, 2010), or looking at content to identify unusual languages, uncharacteristic formats or text that
comprise random words, rather than structured sentences (Voris et al., 2012).
Simulating realistic file repositories can be useful for a range of practical research purposes, such as generating
test data to improve the performance of compression and retrieval in electronic storage systems. Undertaking
research on genuine data is complicated by lack of access to real world corpora, primarily due to privacy or
copyright concerns (Ming et al., 2014; Tarasov et al., 2012). Synthetic data that is more aligned with real world
environments are likely to yield results that are more transferable to practical outcomes.
The research is also applicable to the forensic detection of fake files. The presence of fake files could indicate
malicious or unauthorised activity. Successful detection of fake files may trigger further analysis or allow an
examiner to discard these files as spurious.
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METHOD
Rowe (2006) proposed an approach to detect fake file systems that is relevant to their construction. He believed
that they could be detected by calculating statistics on a candidate file system and its subdirectories, and
comparing these results with a typical real system; significant discrepancies suggest deception. This research
follows Rowe’s approach. The previous 30 years of published file system surveys were reviewed in order to
identify a set of important characteristics that could be used to either construct fake file systems, or detect their
presence. Only recognised peer-reviewed publications were included in the literature review.

PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED FILE SYSTEM METRICS
There have been more than 15 published surveys of file systems since 1977. Table 1 summarises these major
file system surveys, in chronological order of publication. Five other notable studies were conducted on files
and documents, rather than file systems (Barford and Crovella, 1998; Bouayad-Agha and Kilgarriff, 1999;
Chow, 2007; Cunha, 1995; Rowe, 2010). The relevant findings are grouped by metrics below.
Distribution by File Size
Stritter’s (1977) initial observation was that the distribution of file sizes within his sample set could be
approximated by a Pareto distribution. Soon after, Satyanarayanan (1981) identified that his sample distribution
decreased nearly monotonically with increasing file size. He was able to use this result to approximate files by
size based on a hyper-exponential distribution, using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Hájek, 1967), a common approach
to compare sample distributions against a reference probability. Nearly 20 years later, Barford and Crovella
(1998) refined Satyanarayanan’s results to create a hybrid model where the bulk of the file sizes were small,
with a long tail of much less frequently appearing larger files; Satyanarayanan’s approximation split the lognormal distribution of the body (93% of the data) and a heavy tailed distribution of the larger files (above 133kB
in size), with a mean file size of 9.357 and standard deviation of 1.318. This result was supported by Douceur
and Bolosky (1999), who while noting that the previous hyper-exponential distribution was not as natural a fit
for their data, still preferred a log-normal distribution, with a Pareto tail.
Shortly after, Downey (2001) compared the performance of log-normal and hybrid Pareto distributions using
data from Irlam (1993), Arlitt and Jin (2000), Satyanarayanan (1981), and Douceur and Bolosky (1999), also
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov. He was unable to confirm that the previous distributions were long-tailed (i.e.
Pareto), but he still identified that the data could be approximated more accurately by either a single or two
mode log-normal with the distribution skewed towards smaller file sizes. He concluded that even if his model is
not entirely realistic, it is robust to violations of the assumptions.
While distribution by file size may appear to be a common measurement of file systems, there are limitations for
its application in generating synthetic content. Firstly, there is no consensus on a uniform model of distribution;
some researchers were unable to match previous published file size results (Evans and Kuenning 2002; Vogels,
1999). There does appear to be consensus on the overall characteristics.
Secondly, several researchers observed that the average file size increased over time (Agrawal et al., 2007;
Bennett, 1992; Douceur and Bolosky, 1999; Roselli et al., 2000; Sienknecht et al., 1994), which may account
for the variance between surveys. The latter may require the development of a generic generation or detection
metric, which can be adjusted periodically to account for technological change, such as the growth of virtual
machine snapshots and multimedia. This variation may focus on the tail of the distribution elongating, but with
the overall split between large and small file sizes remaining consistent.
Finally, file size metrics are heavily influenced by user activity; different file types exhibit divergent size
distributions (Evans and Kuenning 2002; Satyanarayanan, 1981). For instance, a file repository supporting a
graphics company is likely to have a different set of common file types compared with an elderly home user,
both legitimate real world data. File size models may also be heavily influenced by the inclusion of the
underlying operating system, rather than just user data. This might require the creation of multiple file size
models, which can be applied depending on the mix of content that is required, with the operating system
included as a constant.
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Table 1 – Summary of Previous File System Surveys
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Distribution by File Age
Stritter (1977) was the first to model the age distributions, discovering an exponential distribution. He defined
file age as the elapsed time since ctime. Douceur and Bolosky (1999) published the next significant distribution.
They discovered that the median file age on their sample set was 48 days, three times the values collected by
Stritter (1977), as reported by Smith (1981). Douceur and Bolosky (1999) were able to approximate their results
using a 2-stage hyper-exponential distribution.
Douceur and Bolosky (1999) quantified the fit according to the maximum displacement of the cumulative
curves. Unfortunately, this result failed both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the chi-square test, which limits
their application as governing distributions, even for their own observations.
Agrawal, et al. (2007) and Meyer (2012) believed that Douceur and Bolosky’s (1999) previous results were still
valid. Agrawal, et al. went further to add that: “since the distribution of file age has not appreciably changed
across the years, we can expect that a prediction algorithm developed today based on the latest distribution will
apply for several years to come”. This is a promising result for synthetic file system generation.
There are, however, several limitations of employing previous file age distributions in a general theorem for
sythentic file system generation. Firstly, the metric relies on ctime. As previously discussed, most modern file
systems track three time fields for each file: (1) atime (2) mtime and (3) ctime. The latter can be confused with
‘creation’ time, but the ctime attribute can be modified other than at creation, such as a change in ownership
(Rowe, 2010).
Secondly, file time attributes are unreliable due to: (1) variances in the way in which time stamps attributes are
managed when copying files (Vogels, 1999); and (2) the file system routinely modifying these timestamps as
part of normal system processes (searching files, anti-virus, etc) (Chow, 2007).
Thirdly, the distribution of file ages varies significantly across file systems and user job function. For instance,
the results varied between files systems that provided collective repositories for academic research, as opposed
to individual engineers working for a commercial entity. Potentially separate algorithms may be required for
operating system files and those managed by users and organisations.
Finally, some researchers used trace data, allowing them to observe all file actions, whereas, the snapshot
process (commonly used) missed: (1) creation, modification and access in-between the periodic snapshots; and
(2) changes to the file system whilst scanning other parts of the file system.
Distribution by Functional Lifetime
Satyanarayanan (1981) was the first to introduce the concept of a file’s functional lifetime (f-lifetime). He
defined f-lifetime as the difference between the file’s mtime and atime. That is the difference between the last
access compared to the last modification of the file. He proposed that f-lifetime indicates the time span over
which the data in the file has been demonstrably useful. He discovered that the distribution of files decreases
nearly monotonically with increasing f-lifetime. This finding led him to find hyper-exponential distributions that
approximate these two distributions. Mullender and Tanenbaum (1984), Bennett, et al. (1992), and Douceur
(1999) also supported his findings.
Douceur and Bolosky (1999) noted a reduction in median f-lifetimes between their data set (12 days) and the
original study undertaken by Satyanarayanan (30 days). Both these figures are exclusive of zero f-lifetimes,
which can be the result of system processes, such as temporary Internet files (Rowe, 2010). They also observed
that the distribution of f-lifetimes varies widely. On 50% of file systems, the median f-lifetime ranges from zero
to 6 days, and on 90% of file systems, it ranges from zero to 97 days, reflecting the strong bi-modality. Douceur
and Bolosky (1999) were able to approximate their distribution with a mixture of a constant distribution for zero
f-lifetimes and a 3-stage hyper-exponential distribution. This result is similar in distribution to Satyanarayanan
(1981), but with different parameters, which exposes potential for a general theorem.
Analysing and collecting data on file times is limited by the same challenges previously discussed in the
distribution of files by age. In addition, the principle of locality may be important, which essentially states that
(1) information in recent use is likely to be reused, and (2) information logically adjacent to recently used
information is likely to be referenced soon (Denning, 1972).
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Other Time-based Measurements:
Chow, et al. (2007) provided seven rules associated with attributes times, which are useful for individual file
classification during forensic analysis. These include: (1) when mtime = ctime, the file has neither been
modified since its creation, nor copied from another disk location; (2) when mtime < ctime, the file has been
copied or moved; and (3) when a large number of files with ‘close’ atimes are found inside the hard drive, those
files are likely to be scanned by some tool, e.g. anti-virus software.
Rowe and Garfinkel (2010) expanded on Chow’s results. They grouped documents into three categories: (1)
modified after creation (mtime > ctime), (2) accessed after creation (atime > ctime), and/or (3) accessed after
modification (atime > mtime). They concurred with previous findings from Agrawal, et al. (2007) that: (1) files
that were modified or accessed at least one day before creation (mtime < ctime or atime < ctime), suggest that
the files were downloaded or copied from an external location; (2) clusters of these files in a directory have
ctimes within a minute, suggest that they were downloaded or copied at the same time; and (3) the transfer of
data is actually very common in user controlled file systems. Real-world files systems could contain evidence of
all of the above cases.
Prior to publishing these results, Rowe (2006) suggested analysing file times to identify the mean within the
day, week, and year to see periodic patterns. Expanding on this observation, it might also be useful to compare
the file times against the normal working hours of the owner. For instance a commercial business might have
the majority of ctimes between 0730 and 1930 Monday to Friday, whereas an individual home user times might
primarily record activity in the evenings, after work.
Analysing and collecting data on file times is limited by the same challenges previously discussed in the
distribution of files by age. Moreover, user activity is likely to heavily influence these results. For instance,
individual users with a passion for collecting music or movie files may have a higher than average volume of
externally created files.
Directory Size Distribution
Rowe (2006) noted that statistics on directories are less variable than those relating to files, and therefore
present an important design consideration for fake file system generation. Several researchers (Agrawal et al.,
2007; Bennett et al., 1992; Douceur and Bolosky, 1999; Goncalves and Jorge, 2003; Henderson and Srinivasan,
2009; Meyer, 2012; Sienknecht et al., 1994) reported statistics on the count of files by directory. Douceur and
Bolosky (1999) were the first to present a distribution function for directory sizes. Their observations were
relatively consistent across their sample file systems. Douceur and Bolosky (1999) were able to demonstrate that
their directory size distribution fit offset inverse-polynomial distributions, which allowed them to develop an
approximation with a mixture of a constant distribution for zero-size directories and an inverse-square. These
results were supported by their extended study several years later (Agrawal et al., 2007).
Two interesting observations suggest that a general distribution function for directory sizes could be sustained.
Firstly, Agrawal, et al. (2007) noted that the directory size distribution didn’t change over their five-year
observation period. Secondly, Henderson and Srinivasan (2009) remarked that there was no correlation between
the number of files or folders a person manages and any of the demographic data collected (age, gender,
academic or general staff status, department, position and/or employment tenure).
Four challenges may limit the wider applicability of directory size measurements: (1) there was significant
variation between published means - results ranged from 2 to 13 files without a consistent value or pattern; (2)
there was potentially a growth over time of the number of reported directories that did not contain files (but
could contain directories). Agrawal, et al. (2007) reported that approximately 25% of directories were empty.
This figure is up from 18% recorded by Douceur and Bolosky (1999), who surveyed a similar data set five years
earlier. These results are higher than the 14% observed in large industry file servers by Sienknecht et al. (1994).
(3) Vogels (1999) reported that there was no uniformity in size or content of files between individual user
document repositories; and (4) Goncalves, et al. (2003) also observed that directories generated or managed
automatically by applications tend to have large numbers of files, whereas users tend to separate and classify
documents into sub-directories whenever possible. The latter result might be useful if a fake file system is
required to mimic applications in addition to user data.
Sub-directory Distribution
Sub-directory distribution is the count of sub-directories in each directory (Sienknecht et al., 1994). Henderson
and Srinivasan (2009) suggested a relationship between directory size and the depth. They observed that the
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average number of files per folder is greatest at the top levels of the tree (up to a depth of five), and then drops
off sharply. Agrawal, et al. (2007) noted: “a slight downward trend in this ratio with increasing depth,
punctuated by three depths whose directories have greater-than-typical counts of files: at depth two are files in
the Windows and Program Files directories; at depth three are files in the System and System32 directories; and
at depth seven are files in the web cache directories”. This last result may not hold true for other operating
systems.
Henderson and Srinivasan (2009) also discovered that on average 74% of folders in their samples did not
contain any subfolders. They termed these directories ‘leaf folder’. They also found that there were a high
average number of subfolders at the root of the tree (~9), which sharply drops off (to < 2) by two or three
folders depth. Douceur and Bolosky (1999) also observed similar results. They found that 69% of all directories
contain no subdirectories, 16% contain one, and less than 0.5% contain more than 20. These percentages align
with those reported by Sienknecht et al. (1994), who found 74%, 11%, and 1%, respectively. Douceur and
Bolosky (1999) approximated their results using a mixture of constant distribution for zero-size directories and
an inverse-cube distribution.
Goncalves and Jorge (2003) remarked that their directory count data resembled a Poisson distribution. The
results from Agrawal, et al. (2007), the most comprehensive evaluation of directory distribution for individual
users, also matched a Poisson distribution. This is an notable result for fake file system creation, however, this
distribution is yet to be tested on organisational document repositories.
Other Noted Characteristics
Several researchers provided statistics on file type (including numbers of zip and gzip files), however; only
Goncalves and Jorge (2003) provided a compression ratio (7%). They defined compression ratio as the number
of text-based files with a corpus that have been processed by a compression algorithm within the file system
divided by the total files in the corpus. Their compression ratio excluded images, audio and video content. It is
possible that real-world file systems may contain a consistent data volume or number of compressed files within
their contents; however, more work is required to develop predictable algorithm.
Henderson and Srinivasan (2009) defined duplication ratio as the number of files with an exact replica copy
within the file system divided by the total files in the corpus. Bouayad-Agha and Kilgarriff (1999) reported that
15% of their documents had an exact replica copy in their corpus. Henderson and Srinivasan (2009) noted that
21.8% files had the same name as another file in their file system. While matching file name provides some
level of confidence that the file could contain identical or similar content, a more precise measure may assess
resemblance using such tools as fuzzy hashes.
Finally, there is a conspicuous absence of analysis on file content from the previous surveys. Partial text
duplication arises for many reasons, such as: popular templates, the compulsory application of warning
messages or classification banners, and organisational jargon (Bouayad-Agha and Kilgarriff, 1999). Plotting the
proximity of content reuse may also be important. Its distribution is unlikely to be random. Similar data is likely
to reside within the same or nearby directories, a characteristic of versioning and common users. It may be
possible to identify consistent patterns, such as clustering of frequency of word pairs (n-grams), file naming
conventions and common authorship identification through natural language processing that could assist in
detection and more realistic generations.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Simulating realistic hierarchical file structures is important for research, testing and cyber deception. Currently,
there is an absence of metrics to guide the generation of synthetic file systems. This paper reviewed the previous
30 years of file system surveys in order to assess common metrics that could be applied to this problem. Ten
potential characteristics were discovered: (1) file size, (2) file age, (3) functional lifetime, (4) directory size, (5)
file origin analysis using time attributes, (6) file creation times against normal work hours, (7) directory size, (8)
sub-directory distribution, (9) duplication ratio, and (10) compression ratio. Of these, directory distributions
appear to provide the greatest potential, especially for individual file systems running Windows. There appear to
be established trends in age and size distributions, but the specifics are far too dependent on the situation for a
general theorem, without adjusting thresholds based on ownership (individual or collective), expected working
hours and roles of the file system, and the employed collection method. The final sets of measures involving
ratios are too immature without further experimentation.
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Regardless of maturity, the composition of fake file systems should confirm with all identified real-world
characteristics. Failure to consider one or more attributes could result in a simple detection process exposing the
deception.
Future research should test these identified metrics against a range of individual and collective file systems to
confirm algorithms and determine acceptable tolerances, particularly with a view to assigning variable
thresholds for ownership and employment. Other algorithms could analyse file and folder names, and their
conventions. One notable in these surveys was content analysis. Metrics could be developed to identify
proximity and clustering of similar data content, authorship and vocabulary as a means of detecting data of
different origin placed randomly within folders.
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